We attempt to dissolve the measurement problem using an anthropic principle which allows us to invoke rational observers. We argue that the key feature of such observers is that they are rational (we need not care whether they are 'classical' or 'macroscopic' for example) and thus, since quantum theory can be expressed as a rational theory of probabilistic inference, the measurement problem is not a problem.
The basic measurement problem in quantum theory is the fact that observers don't seem to be passive when it comes to the quantum domain. They seem to weirdly cause things to happen. This is obviously very difficult to come to terms with (and people have admirably tried to come to terms with it). We believe, however, that it is not something that we have to come to terms with and we shall outline in a moment why we don't.
These measurement problems seem to arise when we introduce something that is not explained by quantum theory. For example, in the orthodox interpretation we introduce 'classical' observers, in decoherence theory we introduce 'macroscopic' objects, in other interpretations we invoke 'conscious' observers that cause wavefunctions to collapse or properties to actualise, and in the many worlds interpretation we say that the 'multiverse' splits into many 'universes' such that our experience is explained by the mere fact that we exist in a 'universe' and not in the 'multiverse'. All these attempts to explain away the measurement problem invoke a significant amount of metaphysical baggage. In the following discussion we will also introduce something that is not necessarily explained by quantum theory, but that 'something' will have minimal spurious metaphysical baggage.
We will assume something analogous to the anthropic principle; namely we claim that we exist and that we also try to be rational. This, it turns out, is all we need to dissolve the measurement problem. There is nothing in quantum theory that seems to contradict such a claim, and if it did contradict such a claim (rather than remain mute about it) we would probably reject quantum theory. Thus we argue that there is nothing to stop us from making this quasi-anthropic assumption.
But how does having rational observers dissolve the measurement problem? Firstly we must distinguish two questions. Namely we must distinguish "are these rational observers passive or non-passive?" from "are these rational observers impartial or partial?". Here we use the phrase 'partial observer' to mean the opposite of an impartial observer who has all the relevant information to hand (partial observers are rational but are necessarily party only to a subset of the information that an impartial observer would have). Clearly, if we can justify the answer 'passive' to the first question then we will have dissolved the measurement problem as it is framed above (there is also an even harder measurement problem which we will discuss in a moment). We shall argue that we can give the answer 'passive' to the first question and that we should also give the answer 'partial' to the second.
Clearly people who claim to be rational exist. These observers can analyse one quantum system using its interaction with another quantum system [1] . We do not need to worry about whether these observers are 'classical' or 'quantum'-their important properties are that they exist and that they claim to be rational. We cannot justify any claim that these observers affect the world around them by 'rationalising'. These rational agents rationalise using their brains and they need not yet, when they are being rational, claim that the workings of their brains affect the world at large except through their actions. Thus when a rational observer 'rationalises' and makes predictions this is exactly all that she does. If such observers are partial then their predictions obviously depend upon the information that they are party to. Nor do two partial observers making different predictions cause different things to happen-exactly all that they do is make different predictions, presumably because they are party to different information.
The set of actions that observers can make which directly affect the world at large does not include the act of rationalising. Clearly, observers can, and do, affect the world at large while going about and checking their predictions are apt. If one desires a theory that can derive how partial observers affect the world at large while they check their predictions are apt then simply note that such a theory is not quantum theory. Quantum theory is a theory of the rational probabilistic assignments that partial observers make. When considered in these terms, there is no measurement problem. Quantum theory is not about the interactions between quantum systems, it is about the probabilistic predictions that partial observers make in regards to the interactions between quantum systems-this is tautologically the case since we, as partial observers, discuss the probabilities of propositions rather than claim that those propositions are 'true' or 'false' (we clearly don't have all the information to make an informed truth assignment and must rather make an informed probability assignment). This is close to Bohr's interpretation on the matter [2] except that the important property of observers is not that they are somehow 'classical' but that they are 'rational'.
One can consider a partial observer who makes predictions about other partial observers (treated as quantum systems) but these other partial observers wont behave like quantum systems since they are such complicated structures. It might be that they behave like a gestalt entity made up of many many quantum subsystems. One may as well start investigating something quite small and less complex than a human partial observer. Lets say we investigate an ant instead 1 . A whole load of partial observers rationalising about many small quantum subsystems of an ant might be able to come to some intersubjective agreement about the gestalt of interacting quantum systems which make up the ant. However, there are ethical problems because it is not clear whether the set of partial observers will kill their ant in committing the team to finding out whether their predictions are apt.
Of course, there is another harder measurement problem that we have been skirting around: how do partial observers check that their predictions are apt? This is a very difficult question to answer. Presumably they, as a gestalt of quantum subsystems, interact with the relevant quantum system. We could, as partial observers, investigate this interaction-there is nothing in principle to stop us doing this (it is simply a very complicated thing to do). Then we would either use orthodox or Bayesian statistics to check whether this interaction embodies the statistical properties that we predict. So, in principle, it might be that we can use quantum theory to predict the probabilistic features of an interaction between a partial observer, treated as a gestalt of quantum subsystems, and a quantum system-however such a prediction would necessarily be from the perspective of another partial observer or, more likely, a group of many partial observers working intersubjectively. We are happy to presume they exist, and perhaps even that they are willing to take up the challenge, by our quasi-anthropic principle.
If these partial observers believed they were not being passive while making their predictions then, we argue, they would be irrational. They are explicitly not passive while investigating whether their probabilistic predictions are apt, and this is uncontroversial. Also, if these rational observers were impartial then they would not need to invoke probabilities at all. The domain of study of quantum theory is thus the passive probabilistic predictions of partial observers. Note that by invoking necessarily partial observers we are also absolved of committing ourselves to EPR-and Bell-nonlocality in quantum theory-see [3] and [4] respectively. Elsewhere we also argue that quantum theory can be framed in such a way that it is 'complete' [4] (although this perhaps is simply an argument of semantics). Arguably, the only problem we have left is the interpretation of probability.
Since the key property of these observers is that they seem to be rational it is clear that we, as humans, need not be the only partial observers. We could, in principle, work out the axioms of rationality that we use in designing a theory of probability like quantum theory and ensure that a computer also follows such axioms. We could also, in principle, manually teach a group of humans or monkeys to do the same thing (without them necessarily being aware of it of course) by ensuring they are taught to follow simple rules which manifestly ensure that such criteria of rationality are obeyed. Thus we would ensure that quantum theory doesn't afford us a special place in the universe. Our first attempt at finding such criteria of rationality for quantum theory should follow an approach analogous to Cox's account of standard probability theory [5, 6] (as Cox explicitly uses such criteria). A first attempt is given in [4, 7, 8] .
If we have a good definition of a partial observer then what are the corresponding observables that they measure? This is a question that Rovelli compellingly answers in his wonderful 'partial observables' paper [9] -a paper to which we pay homage here 2 .
